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practices." The court therefore concluded that a suspension of the
license to practice was "not necessary to give time for reformation of
the defendant." 9
Cannon, on the other hand, although criticized in Hepp v. Petie,10 for
similar misconduct, had shown up to the time of trial no reformation of
practice methods, and so was suspended from the practice of law in the
state of Wisconsin for two years. The referee found that the defendant
charged unconscionable and excessive fees for services performed. He
thus showed that he had not recognized the fact that "the practice of law
is not a trade, but a ministry."''
It is as true today as it was fifty years ago, when Chief Justice Ryan
said in his address before the graduates of the University Law School,
that "the pursuit of the legal profession for the mere wages of life is
a mistake alike of the means and the end. It is a total failure of apprecia-
tion of the character of the profession."
CARL F. ZEIDLER
Guaranty: Liability: Compromise and Settlement
When a party guarantees that an agent will perform his contract with
his principal by guaranteeing to pay anything due under the terms of
the contract, said party thereby makes himself primarily liable to the
principal. Any settlement made by the agent with his principal will not
release the guarantor from his liability because of a lack of considera-
tion, the agent being a stranger to the contract made between the princi-
pal and the guarantor. In case the agent defaults or fails to perform
his contract, and there is still money due and owing the principal, the
principal can accept whatever the agent is able to advance. Such ac-
ceptance does not constitute a wavier of the principal's right to collect
the deficiency from the guarantor. He has in fact contracted to answer
to the principal in just such a situation as this.
The simple rule of law that a guaranty contract involves primary
liability is quite fundamental and necessary know-ledge for the practicing
attorney to have tucked away in his mind. It concerns a situation that
is common and liable to confront him any day. The recent case of the
Wisconsin Supreme Court, Swift and Co. v. Geraghty, 226 N.W. 381,
furnishes a foundation for this brief review on the nature of a guaranty
contract of this kind. The main fact to bear in mind is that the guaranty
contract is separate and apart from the contract entered into between
principal and agent. It concerns only principal and guarantor, the
'State v. Kiefer (Wis.) 222 N.W. 795, 797.
' 185 Wis. 350, 200 N.W. 857.
' Ellis v. Frawley, 165 Wis. 381, 385, 161 N.W. 364, 366.
NOTES AND COMMENT
breach of contract between principal and agent being the spring that
sets the guaranty contract in action.
Suppose A hires B to sell watches for him. B is a young man who is
expected to succeed so that A thinks he will make good on the job, but
A doesn't feel entirely safe in having only B to answer for the watches
so he says, "B, I have faith in your ability but I can't leave, this business
in your hands solely on the strength of my faith. I want you to get
some substantial person to back you and guarantee that should you de-
fault in the performance of your contract, this other person will be liable
to me for whatever loss I incur." B gets his friend C to sign*a con-
tract guaranteeing that should B default in the performance of his con-
tract with A, C will answer for the same. Now B does fall back on his
payments, or defaults in some other manner. A takes back whatever
property is on hand, B paying probably something additional but still
leaving a balance due and owing to A. Does the fact that A accepts this
property and money from B, release C from his contract of guaranty?
The answer is self evident, if there is still money due and owing under
the contract, C has guaranteed to pay this balance and is primarily
liable to A.
In the Geraghty case, one Goebel entered into a contract to act as
agent for Swift and Company. Geraghty was guarantor for the per-
formance of Goebel's contract. When Goebel died, he owed the com-
pany a certain sum of money. Agents of Swift and Company accepted
from the representatives of Goebel's estate the goods on hand as part
payment on the amount due. Swift and Company later brought suit
to collect the balance due under the contract from the guarantor, Ger-
aghty. The defense is thai there was an accord and satisfaction by ac-
ceptance of the goods on hand; secondly, that plaintiff's failure to file a
claim against the agent's estate was a bar to recovery on the guaranty
contract.
1. A contract guaranteeing the performance of a certain other con-
tract by the payment of all sums due thereunder, creates a primary
liability in the guarantor. Hubbard v. Healy, 96 Wis. 578. This rule
of law was laid down in this state as early as Malloney v. Lyman, 3 Pin.
443, and has been followed ever since.
2. It is held in Estate of Mener, 189 Wis. 340, that, under a well
settled law, there must be a new consideration moving either to the
guarantor or payee, in order to release the guarantor. In the instant
case the court found that the evidence showed no testimony to the effect
that the entire account was to be settled on return of the goods on hand.
Such being the case there certainly was not an accord and satisfaction
of money due under the contract by taking back the goods held by the
agent. If the representative had given something over and above or
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different from what was due under the contract, the guarantor might be
able to show new consideration and therefore a release because of ac-
cord and satisfaction.
3. The fact that plaintiff did not file its claim against the estate of
the agent, is in no way a bar to it recovering from the guarantor. By his
contract, the guarantor became primarily liable for whatever money
might be due and owing under the terms of the contract. The plaintiff
elected to collect from the guarantor and such election was within the
privilege of their contract.
In the case of Loverin and Brown Co. v. Travis, 135 Wis. 332, it is
held that where a guaranty is one of payment and not of mere collection,
no efforts to collect from the debtor are necessary before making demand
on the guarantor. See also Minter v. Branch Bank of Mobile, 23 Ala.
762; Bull v. Doe, 77 Cal. 54; and Willis v. Chowning, 90 Tex. 617.
SYLVESTER S. SANGER
Intoxicating Liquor: Search and Seizure: Preliminary Hearing
In thumbing over recent decisions reported in the Federal Reporter
advance sheets, we find many of the cases have come up as a result
of someone violating the prohibition law. Most of us are wholly un-
familiar with the operation of the law in the prosecution and the defense
of these liquor violators, so a typical case has been singled from among
a number of such decisions and a report thereon is herewith given so
that we may have at least a faint recollection of coming in contact with
the subject. There is a marked similarity among all the cases in this
field, for after all, they usually arise out of similar circumstances. The
case under discussion is Herter v. United States, 33 Fed. 400, and 33 Fed.
402.
To make a long story short and to start at the end and work toward
the starting of the action, Herter's house was raided by agents by virtue
of a search warrant issued by one Jackson who was the United States
Federal Prohibition Director for the district of Montana. As a result
of this raid, there was delivered up to Jackson and placed in his care,
456 quarts of beer, three quarts of wine, one pint of whiskey, and
various pieces of personal property, such as, copper boilers, copper
buckets, steins, etc. Herter contends that the issuance of the warrant
was void and that as there is to be no action taken on the seizure that
he is entitled to have his property returned to him. He appears in Fed-
eral Court petitioning it to order Jackson to return his property. Here is
the story that is presented to the court:
Adams, an undercover agent of the government, went to the dwelling
of Herter and represented himself as being an attorney in search of the
